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In their lead article on the "Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement" (this Journal,
1981), Michael Block, Frederick Nold, and Joseph Sidak (hereafter BNS) analyzed the
interactions between competitive buyers and collusive sellers under an enforcement regime
of treble damages for antitrust violations. They concluded that the prospect of treble
damage awards would inevitably cause conspiring sellers to price below the level they
would choose in the absence of antitrust enforcement. Consequently, output and aggregate
surplus were predicted to increase relative to laissez-faire.
BNS sought to formalize and test empirically the prior analysis of William Breit and
Kenneth Elzinga (hereafter, BE). In their path-breaking article and book, and-more
recently-in their retrospective survey on the subject of antitrust penalties, BE (1974, 1976,
1985) emphasized that the prospect of treble damage awards encourages victims to "get
damaged." They pointed out, (1974, p. 337) for example, that "In the electrical equipment
conspiracy, there was evidence that the customers of this cartel were either aware (or had
strong suspicions) that they were purchasing under a regime of rigged bidding." BE
emphasized (1974, p. 335) that treble-damage awards create a "perverse incentive" for
buyers to purchase (at any given price) additional units of a good in anticipation that they
may get rewarded trebly for the resulting increase in damages.
Although BNS sought to build in part on the prior work of BE, they neglected to in-
corporate the central insight of BE that the prospect of treble damages stimulates.demand
at any given price. BE in turn failed to note that in anticipation of this outward shift in
demand, colluding sellers will adjust their price. The purpose here is to take account both
of the incentive of the buyers to "get damaged" and its effect on the pricing strategy of the
sellers. Under a plausible condition on the exogenous data, a neutrality result is shown to
hold. Under this condition, imposition of a multiple-damage regime haS no effect on out-
put, aggregate surplus or its expected distribution relative to laissez-faire and must raise
the market price. When this neutrality result does not hold, imposing multiple damages
increases output and aggregate surplus while reducing the expected surplus of the sellers.
We begin by characterizing the market equilibrium in the absence of any antitrust
enforcement. We then reconsider BNS' assessment of the multiple-damage regime-taking
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proper account of the buyers' "perverse incentives." The conditions when the neutrality
result holds are characterized and comparative static results are derived with and without
neutrality.
Having clarified the implications of the traditional model, we conclude with a more
fundamental critique of the BE/BNS framework and a constructive suggestion for an al-
ternative approach.
2. The Positive and Normative Effects of Multiple-Damages for Price-fixing
A. No Enforcement
Consider the case of a price-fixing conspiracy among sellers of an intermediate input
produced at constant marginal cost (C). Competitive buyers purchase in aggregate Q units
of the input at per-unit price P and earn P(Q) dollars in revenue from sale of the resulting
output.
In the absence of antitrust enforcement, buyers will take as given the price they are
charged and will select the amount they wish to purchase by equating the value of the
marginal product of the acquired input to the per-unit price of that input. Anticipating
this reaction, the colluding sellers will charge a price which maximizes profits. The resulting
equilibrium is the solution to the following constrained optimization problem:
max (P.-C)Q (P1)
Q,P O
subject to: Q = a.rgrinaxx>o{P(X) - PX}.
Figure 1 goes here
We depict this problem graphically in Figure 1. The isoprofit contours of the firm in
P - Q space have the shape of conventional indifference curves. For P > C, increases in
quantity or price (or any combination) raise profits. Hence the preference-direction is to
the "northeast." For simplicity, we portray the locus of {Q, F) combinations satisfying the
downward-sloping constraint as a line. The constraint can be recognized as the familiar
value-marginal-product schedule. The optimum occurs at (Q., Pm)-the tangency point


















QmF"(Q) + F'(Q) - C = 0( (1)
and P. = F'(Qm). (2)
B. Enforcement
Suppose now the sellers risk having to compensate buyers multiple damages for an-
titrust violations. Following BNS, let t denote the damage multiple (set under current law
at three) and let d(A,y) denote the probability the penalty is imposed. BNS assume that
this probability is an increasing function of (1) the seller markup (A = (P - C)/C) and (2)
the exogenous level of enforcement (-); that is, dA > 0, d., > 0. Under this regime, the in-
centives of the sellers and buyers are altered and the new equilibrium can be characterized
as the solution to the following constrained optimization problem:
max (P - C)Q - max (O,td(A,)(P - C)Q)
Q.P>O
subject to Q = argmaxx>0 {F(X) - PX + max (0, td(A,-y) (P - C)X)}.
If td(0, 7) ;> 1, then td(A, ^y) > 1 and for any P > C (A > 0) the cartel would expect to
pay in fines more than it receives in profits. It would then be optimal to set price equal to
marginal cost. We refer to this uninteresting case as "complete deterrence" and, following
the literature, do no consider it further.
In the more interesting case where td(0, -y) < 1, the cartel has an incentive to price
above marginal cost and deterrence is said to be "incomplete". The foregoing maximization
problem then reduces to:
max (P - C)Q - td(A,' )(P - C)Q
Q,P>O
subject to Q = argmaxx>0 {F(X) - PX + td(A,'y)(P - C)X}. (P2)
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Note that we have departed from BNS by taking proper account of the buyers' incentives
under a treble-damage regime to get damaged (the last term in the right-hand side of the
constraint).1 We maintain BNS' assumption that the cartel is risk-neutral and assume that
buyers are likewise risk-neutral.
To analyze (P2), define P = P - td(A,y)(P - C). Then (P2) can be re-written as:
max (P-C)Q
P,Q,P 2O
subject to Q = argmaxx>o{F(X) - PX} (P2')
and P = P - td(A,y)(P- C).
Note that the objective function and first constraint involve only the variables P and
Q. Indeed-if we replaced P by P-both the objective function and the first constraint
in (P2') would be identical to their counterparts in (P1). Hence, in P - Q, space, the
isoprofit contours would be identical to those in Figure 1. Moreover, the locus of (Q, F)
combinations satisfying the first constraint in (P2') would be identical to the locus of
(Q, P) combinations depicted as the constraint in Figure 1. However, the constraint set
in (P2') may be smaller since a second constraint must simultaneously be satisfied. Since
this second constraint involves P and P, it potentially further restricts what values of P
are feasible.
As long as P = Pm is feasible, the optimal solution to (P2') involves setting P = Pm
and Q = Qm. Intuitively, the program which is optimal for (P1) will be optimal for (P2')
(with P replaced by P) since the objective functions are the same and the only alternatives.
deleted from the feasible set of (P2') were suboptimal in (P1). Thus, as long as P = Pm
is feasible, increases in the damage multiple or the intensity of enforcement will have no
effect on output.
This result may seem surprising at first but will become obvious after a moment's
reflection. Although P may nominally be the price charged, the "true" price to both
buyers and sellers is instead P-the market price net of the expected per unit revenue to
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be transferred through the courts. If the sellers can indirectly set the net price at Pm by
suitable choice of the market price, demand will be unchanged (Qm ) and seller profits will
still be maximized.2
Since market efficiency depends on the amount produced (Qm), variations in the level
of antitrust enforcement will not affect total market surplus as long as P = Pm can be
achieved. Hence, if enforcement. involves any resource costs no enforcement is strictly
preferable to a level which induces incomplete deterrence.
Similarly, the distribution of surplus net of expected court transfers will be unchanged.
Consumers will continue to expect F(Q.) - PmQm and sellers will continue to expect
(Pm - C)Qm. In the event that no court transfer occurs, buyers are worse off than in the
absence of mutiple-damage enforcement; when a court transfer does occur, they are better
off than under laissez-faire.
Consider now the effect of the multiple-damage regime on the market price. Whenever
the neutrality result holds, increased enforcement will result in unchanged output. Since
buyers have increased incentive to "get damaged," demand will shift outward and the mar-
ket price will always exceed the monopoly level under laissez-faire. Suppose, for example,
the probability of detection were insensitive to changes in the markup: d(A,y) = g(y). In
this case, P is an increasing, linear function of P and setting P = P. is always feasible.
Using the second constraint in (P2'), we can solve explicitly for the market price:
P = (Pm - tg(y)C)/(1 - tg()). (3)
Since the monopoly price exceeds the marginal cost of production, (PmC > 0), dP/dy > 0
and dP/dt > 0-provided deterrence is incomplete (1 - tg(y) > 0).9 Hence, increases in
either the level of enforcement or the damage multiple will raise the market price mono-
tonically above the monopoly level.
If the probability function (d(A,-)) is sufficiently elastic, it may be infeasible to set the
net price P = Pm. In that case, the neutrality result does not hold and the multiple-
damage regime will have real effects.
To determine these effects, reconsider the second constraint in (P2'). P = C can always
be achieved by setting P = C. If P = Pm is infeasible, there will be some highest net price,
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Pma <Am which can be achieved. Continuity of d(A,-) insures that any Fe [C, Fmax] is
feasible.'
The optimum to (P2') then occurs at P = P7,7  < P, and Q = argmaxx>0 {F(X)
PmaxX} > Qm. Compared to laissez-faire, consumers will buy more since the expected
net price (Pma) is reduced. Total surplus will rise since the reduced net expected price
still exceeds marginal cost. Since the sellers can no longer achieve (Qm, Pm), expected
producer surplus must decline. This in turn implies that expected consumer surplus must
rise. Finally, since output will expand the market price need not rise despite the outward
shift in demand.
It remains for us to characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for the neutrality
result to hold. Let A= "'. Then the second constraint of (P2') can be rewritten as
A = A[1 - td(A,7)].
Let Am = -c. If-for some P-the second constraint of (P2') implies P = Pm,C
then A = Am and A must solve the following equation:
1
d(A,'j) = -[1 - Am/A].
t
As Figure 2 depicts, the right-hand side of this equation monotonically increases in A,
crosses the horizontal axis at Am and asymptotes to the horizontal line of height 1/t. The
curve shifts down by a constant proportion if the exogenous damage multiple is increased.
Figure 2 goes here
The neutrality result holds if and only if d(A, 7) crosses the curve in Figure 2 ( for
A > 0). For example, it holds if the probability function is constant (d(A, y) = d < 1/t)
and, more generally, for any d(A, ) function such that limA,., d(A, y) < 1/t. On the other
a-
hand, for any non-constant d(A, '7) function, there exist damage multiples sufficiently large
for the enforcement regime to have real effects.5 .
3. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to review and correct the existing literature on the

















received framework should be clarified. Central to the received model is the assumption
that buyers and sellers share a common expectation about the subsequent damage award.
However, both the probability of this award and its magnitude depend in part on the costs
of the sellers. Sellers have better information about their own costs than buyers. Buyers
can only make educated guesses about these costs. When buyers are charged a lot for an
item, they try to infer whether they are dealing with a high cost but competitive industry
on the one hand or alternatively whether they are being ripped off by a low-cost collection
of price fixers.6 How treble-damage awards affect prices and welfare when buyers have




This research benefited greatly from the insight of Glenn Gotz. Comments from Mark Bag-
noli, Ted Bergstrom, Severin Borenstein, Jonathan Cave, Sam Peltzman, Mitch Polinsky,
Dick Porter and Joseph Swierzbinski were useful in revising an earlier draft. An indepen-
dent analysis by Jonathan Baker (1985) makes some of the same points; I am grateful to
Steve Salop for identifying the similarities and putting us in contact.
'BNS [1981, p. 432], erroneously assume that demand is independent of the damage
multiple and the intensity of enforcement. Under this assumption, the sellers' problem is
to
P-C
max ir(P) = Q(P)[P - C][1 - td( , ]
P>0 C
der, P - C
= -td|{{ -tC)Q(P) + Q(P)} - Q(P)AtdA( P C )
At the monopoly price under laissez-faire (Pm), the expression in braces is zero and hence
- Ii 0, with equality if and only if dA = 0. Given appropriate second-order condi-
tions, BNS therefore conclude that as long as the probability function has any sensitivity
to the markup, the imposition of treble damages must reduce the market price-and, there-
fore, must increase aggregate output and surplus. The implications of this analysis when
recovery is incomplete are discussed in the appendix.
2 The general point is obvious once it is properly posed. Consider first the case of a per-unit
subsidy that is a constant or increasing function of P: such a subsidy to consumers will
have no effect on purchases, welfare, or distribution if it is financed by a per unit tax on
producers. For in that case, the market price will simply rise to offset the tax and the
price paid net of the subsidy and the price received net of the tax will not change. This
unchanged net price will continue to clear the market if sellers are competitive and will
continue to be profit-maximizing if they are collusive.
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Consider next the case where the per-unit subsidy is instead a nonlinear function of
price (as in the case of expected awards for damages). The foregoing analysis then requires
modification if and only if there exists no market price such that the per-unit cost to
buyers-net of the subsidy-is the same as the pre-subsidy price. If none exists, the
subsidy will have real effects; aggregate surplus will decline under competition (in the
absence of externalities) and producer surplus will decline under monopoly.
3To illustrate, suppose F(Q) = aQ - bQ2 . Then buyer demand will be:
a-P +td(P-C)
That is, buyers will increase their demand (for P > C) so as to get damaged. Sellers
respond to this shifted demand by setting price at
*-a+ C(1 -2td)
2(1-td)
Substituting into the buyer demand function, we find that the quantity demanded will be:
Q*(P*) = ,
2b
regardless of the damage multiple or enforcement probability (provided deterrence is incom-
plete). Total surplus will, therefore, be invariant to exogenous changes in these parameters.
As for the distribution of that surplus, sellers expect profits of
(a - C)2II(P*) = (1 - td)(P* - C)Q = (a '
4b
which is likewise invariant to changes in t and d. Provided deterrence is incomplete,
therefore, increased enforcement only affects the market price. In this case,
dP _dP _(a- C)d 0
sgdd dt 2(1 -td) 2
Hence, increased enforcement will raise the market price above the monopoly level.





and t = 3. Since this d(A,.) function lies entirely above the boundary in Figure 2, the
treble-damage regime will in this case result in increased output and surplus. It may be
verified that Pjiax = Prm + {C < Pm and is achieved at P = P, . Hence, the outward
shift in demand is just matched by the increase in output so that the market price remains
at the same level as before the treble-damage regime was imposed.
0It is somewhat ironic that in the well-known limit-pricing model of Milgrom and Roberts
(1982), it is the low-cost firms which want to distinguish themselves and the high-cost
firms which want to masquerade as low-cost firms. In the model sketched the roles are
reversed; it is the low-cost firms who wish to appear to have high costs.
7For an early contribution to litigation games under incomplete information, see Rest and
Salant (1982); for a generalization, see Salant (1984).
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Appendix: Incomplete Recovery
Given the analysis in the text, it is sometimes thought that-if buyers recover only a
portion of the damages collected from the sellers-a multiple damage regime will always
increase surplus. Consider the case where buyers receive no compensation whatsoever.
Then the original analysis of Block et. al. (reviewed in footnote 1) is appropriate and
surplus does increase-provided dA > 0.
Regardless of the extent of recovery, however, a multiple damage regime can never
affect aggregate surplus if d, = 0. Assume buyers receive 0 times the damages paid for
any 0 > 0 such that 1 - Otd > 0. Then the firm seeks to:
max (P-C)Q-td(P-C)Q=(1-td)(P-C)Q
Q,P>0
subject to Q = argmaxx>0{F(X) - PX +6Otd(P - C)X}.
Define P = P - Otd(P - C) => P - C = (P - C)(1 - Otd). Then the firm's problem
can be transformed as follows:
(- id)mx ( - C)Q
p,Q, P>0 (1-~ 6td)
subject to Q = argmaxx>o{F(X) P-X}, (Al)
P -6tdC*'
and P = . (A2)
1-6td
Note that the transformed objective function and first constraint (Al) involve only the
variables P and Q (not P). Since the objective function is a scaled multiple of the objective
function under laissez-faire while (Al) and the constraint under laissez-faire (P1) are
identical (with P replaced by 1f), teoptimum will occur at P = P. and Q = Qm provided
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the second constraint (A2) can be satisfied for some nonnegative P. Since 1 - td > 0,
satisfying (A2) presents no problem.
The welfare effects of enforcement in this example can now be compared to laissez-
faire. Aggregate surplus depends on Q and hence will not change. Buyers will continue to
receive F(Qm) - PmQm. Sellers now receive .~ (,m C)Q,. If 0<1, firm profits
therefore decline (and the community benefits an offsetting amount from the receipt of
lump-sum payments). If instead 0 > 1, firm profits increase (and the community is injured
an offsetting amount from payment of a lump-sum tax). As long as buyers receive some
compensation (0 > 0), the demand curve will shift rightward at any given market price
(P) and hence the market price must rise (above Pm) to restrain demand to Qm.
2
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